This new development did not however result from the embargo against Rhodesia, for the embargo has proved a failure. It was not the only blunder committed in the Rhodesia conflict. The agreement of March 3, 1978 has been fiercely attacked -primarily by outsiders who feel responsible for the political developments in Rhodesia or claim a right to intervene in Rhodesian affairs. A curious situation has thus arisen which cannot but confuse the detached observer and raise doubts in the minds of those who have watched the developments in this region for some time about the political and foreign-political concepts of many Western countries. This criticism applies to both the way in which economic sanctions are being employed and the way in which partisan support is given to political groups which openly reject any kind of democratic state organization. For years extremist Africans have been * Cologne University.
the only ones to be given an appreciative hearing in the UN, and even Western states have now taken on the role of advocate for Soviet interests. In spite of all the negative experience in the past they are still so amazingly short-sighted as to believe that marxist-authoritarian and militant minorities can be integrated into interim governments in order to guarantee peaceful transition to democratic majority rule.
It is appalling to see with what unconcern the use of economic sanctions is being demanded on many occasions. The reluctance of many politicians to learn from the practical experience with embargoes is associated with a posture of universal political competency and a proneness to economic interventionism. The political and economic consequences of this policy are misunderstood 1 Attention is drawn in the following to the more specifically economic and organizational aspects of the embargo against Rhodesia although the political background -of the initiators of as well as the opponents to the embargo -deserves equal consideration if realistic conclusions are to be drawn 2. In the UN demands have been voiced for economic sanctions against South Africa, too. An analysis of the embargo imposed K61n, Vol. 25, Cologne 1973 . Both these studies were undertaken for the Federal Ministry of Econom=c Affairs through the Cologne University Institute for Economic Policy. 2 The political aspect of the Rhodesia conflict (the political situation and developments in Rhodesia and the UN) was dealt with in detail in the study because the international discussion is in my view hampered by a calamitous lack of factual knowledge of the political aspect. The study covers events up to May 1977; the development since then has followed the indicated trends in almost all details.
on Rhodesia will therefore also answer the question whether an embargo on South Africa stands a chance of success. South Africa is of course in a much better economic and political position than Rhodesia.
Embargoes an Instrument of Foreign Policy
The precise meaning of the term embargo is by no means clear-even to many jurists 3. The terms boycott, blockade, injunction and embargo are being used somewhat indiscriminately. It therefore makes good sense to start by stating the objective and subjective characteristics of an embargo:
Embargoes are an instrument of foreign policy.
As distinct from the boycott, an embargo predicates state initiative and execution. It is an aggressive form of international economic policy. The aim is to discriminate against and injure a state or group of states by total or selective bans on trade, transport and capital movements. The infliction of economic injury is treated as a means of influencing the pofitical conduct of the state or group of states put under an embargo. The initiators of the embargo on their side must be willing to put up with economic disadvantages falling on them as weft.
The embargo is a very old instrument; instances in which it has been used are known from antiquity 4, and failures in its application can be traced back for an equally long time. Until the twentieth century however embargoes remained a contentious instrument of foreign policy. The evolution of the idea of collective security turned the embargo into a recognized instrument of preventive and peaceful settlement of conflicts; as such it was included in the statutes of the League of Nations (Art. 16) and the UN Charter (Art. 41).
The Reasons for the Failure
The economic sanctions against Rhodesia are the first embargo imposed by the UN Security Council but they are only one more link in a chain of embargoes which seem to have been employed with a view to the systematic repetition of all the mistakes of previous embargo cases: There were no thorough analyses of the organizational and economic conditions; and the possibilities were always overrated. The salient feature of the embargo against Rhodesia is therefore the wide gap between the expectations and conditions for an embargo and between the political pronounce-ments and the actual decisions. The international trade was victimized to suit a badly conceived foreign policy. The structural harm done to the international trade by this kind of political interventionism was always long-lasting. [] Want of solidarity between the embargo initiators and absence of a system of mutual support (cost-sharing).
Overrated Dependence
A thorough analysis of this fundamental prerequisite to an embargo has probably never been undertaken. At most assumptions have been made about this dependence on the outside world on the strength of a glance at the distribution of Rhodesia's foreign trade. To the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson it seemed in early January 1966 that the success of the embargo was "a matter of weeks rather than months".
At a first glance Rhodesia appeared indeed to be greatly dependent on its foreign trade: Rhodesia was a "small" country with a high foreign trade intensity (in 1965 the GNP at market prices amounted to about US $ 1,000 mn, the exports to US $ 400 mn and the imports to US $ 340 mn). The distribution of trade over categories of goods and countries was marked by a high concentration. Agricultural and mineral raw materials predominated among the exports; SITC groups 0-2 accounted for 57.6 % of the total exports and tobacco alone for 32.0 % . But Rhodesia also exported over 30 % of processed goods of groups 6-9 and high-quality mineral raw materials in strong demand in the world market (chrome, asbestos, nickel). Among imports manufactured goods of groups 6-9 were prominent and accounted for 67.9 %. Most of the foreign trade was done with quite a small number of countries; eight countries took 81% of Rhodesia's exports and supplied 77% of its imports; 41.6% of the exports and 28.1% of the imports were done with the neighbouring states of Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, South Africa and SouthWest Africa (Namibia).
These brief notes give some indication of Rhodesia's capacity to substitute local products for imports. The Rhodesian economy had already "taken off" in the development policy sense of the term; Rhodesia was no longer an agricultural country but had raw materials, "know-how", skilled personnel and a market in the adjoining countries which collaborated with Rhodesia for political reasons (South Africa and Mozambique until 1974) and/or on economic grounds (Zambia, Malawi, Botswana). In 1967 two economists used an input-output matrix for the Rhodesian economy of 1965 for a model computation to show the theoretical effectiveness of an import embargo on Rhodesia's 12 major export commodities and a total embargo on exports to Rhodesia s. Curtin and Murray arrived at somewhat sobering results even for the extreme case of 100 % compliance whit the embargo and Rhodesian inability to replace the imports: they concluded that the value added would decline by 15 % at most and that the structure of the economy and incomes would ultimately suffer no decisive change. A more realistic departure from these extreme assumptions would greatly improve the situation from the Rhodesian point of view (possibility of import substitution, diversion of exports via other countries, etc.) 6.
Gaps in Embargo Lists
As all adjustments take time, economic sanctions must be taken immediately and on as comprehensive a scale as possible 7. In the case of Rhodesia this fact was ignored in more than one respect:
[] The Rhodesian Government was able to determine when the embargo was to commence and was given time to prepare for it. The unilateral separation of the colony from the mother country was a matter of open discussion from the as- The present study, by means of an efficiency analysis, depicts the functional mechanisms and the significance of the Euro-capital-market for the allocation of capital within the international framework. The efficiency criteria underlying the analysis do not only admit an identification of real events in the capital market but may also be allied to the functions of the Euro-capitat-market. In detail they comprise capacity, flexibility, cost and stability of the Euro-capital-market. (In German.) Large octavo, 370 pages, 1978, price paperbound DM 42,60 ISBN 3-87895-174-4 
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[] The economic sanctions were put into effect in a very tardy and half-hearted manner. Great Britain seems to have been almost entirely unprepared. It took several months to ban all economic relations with Rhodesia. It took the UN Security Council 13 months after the recommendation of an embargo (Nov. 20, 1965) to impose a formal and obligatory selective embargo (Dec. 16, 1966 -Res. 232, 1966 and as long as 31 months to pass a formal and obligatory comprehensive economic embargo (May 29, 1968 -Res. 253, 1968 
Lack of Universality
Until December 1966 the embargo on Rhodesia was optional for all countries. When the economic sanctions were made obligatory under Art. 25 of the UN Charter, many countries nevertheless abstained from applying them -because they were unable to apply them or because they were unwilling to do so or because they did not wish to relinquish their neutral status. No more than 100 countries, of a total UN membership of 127, reported in 1968 that they had acted on the economic embargo in toto. Switzerland, not being a member of the UN -and until 1968 Austria also -did not submit to the Security Council decisions. Switzerland insisted on continuing to do business with Rhodesia to the normal extent (courant normal) and merely promised to limit the Rhodesian trade in any year to the average volume of the preceding three years. The Swiss Government refused to take action against Swiss firms of which it was proved or believed that they were taking part in acts violating the embargo resolutions.
The Byrd amendment in the USA in 1971 was probably the gravest violation of the embargo. It allowed Rhodesian chrome to be imported into the USA from 1972 onwards, and other high-grade metals later, so that the USA should not be too dependent on Soviet supplies of these strategic commodities!
The reports of the sanctions committee of the Security Council show that Eastern bloc countries (the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union) also participated in embargo violations. Moreover, the governments showed little inclination to help the sanctions committee in detecting suspected violations. There was sometimes no response at all to requests for official assistance. The answers were as a rule in very general terms and confined strictly to the questions asked. Being received after several months, they often necessitated further enquiries so that procedural matters frequently took several years and, with few exceptions, prevented successful action.
Shortcomings of the Embargo Controls
A collective embargo affects its initiators to different degrees if the economic intercourse with the embargoed country is interrupted. To assure cohesion of the embargo front, the UN Charter provides (in Art. 50) for a system of mutual support (cost sharing). However, all attempts to put this system into effect, especially in support of Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique, have come to nothing, leaving breaches in the embargo front.
Embargo Effects
The embargo has not been devoid of economic repercussions but its political objective has not been achieved. The relative political tranquility in Rhodesia is due to several reasons: First and foremost the embargo made for solidarity among the whites; there was the massive policy of repression against Africans, especially against their warring political parties; the strong traditional . 11, 1974, p. 16-19; CSTO, Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, Dec. 1974, p. 18. attachment of most Africans to their tribes and villages and the benevolent attitude of the African chieftains and kraal elders to the minority government which has appointed them. Rhodesia has a dualist economy -in 1974 59 % of the Africans were still living in an entirely non-monetary selfsupply economy -so that the potential of the embargo as a factor making for political disturbance was correspondingly reduced.
The partial economic isolation had a similar effect as a protective duty. The manufacturing and mining industries expanded while agriculture underwent a relative contraction. The acreage under tobacco was reduced; instead more wheat, maize and citrus fruit was grown. This was the background of the political turnaround of the Rhodesian Government which has taken place since 1976. Seen in isolation, Rhodesia could have withstood both the embargo and the guerilla operations longer; but had they continued to resist, the whites would no longer have had a private, economic or political future in Rhodesia.
Notes on the Political Situation
The findings of the analysis of the embargo against Rhodesia allow the conclusion that economic sanctions would prove of no avail against South Africa. If anything they would delay the gradual elimination of racial discrimination. South Africa has for more than a decade pursued an economic policy of partial autarky in many sectors of the economy (e.g. energy supplies). Besides, South Africa is too important a trading partner for Wes- This strategic corner-stone of a policy for the South of Africa is however being threatened. There is a risk in the Western policy vis-&-vis Rhodesia and South-West Africa (Namibia) favouring a racism in reverse; there is once again a danger that the power of government will depend on the colour of skin and force of arms rather than legitimization by the rule of law and protection of minorities. What else is one to think if efforts are being made to secure special privileges for militant minorities. Lenin's writings about the formation of committees and transitional governments in the revolutionary process may be consulted with advantage in this context.
The rejection of the "internal" solution in Rhodesia by the "confrontation states", the Western states and the Eastern bloc states amounts to an arrogation of the right of deciding political developments in Rhodesia and a denial of the right of self-determination to the Rhodesians. That the formal transition to black majority rule will not solve the problems by itself is ignored completely; the friction between the tribes (Shona, Ndebele) has been a constant element of the Rhodesian situation for scores of years: in the last few years ideological components have been superimposed on it. Political logic suggests a development as envisaged under the "internal solution". The grant of privileges to the "Patriotic Front" and the latter's expected and already announced attempts to usurp the power by force of arms would not merely mean economic chaos in Rhodesia but be a decisive step towards an African variant of the domino theory which would aggravate international conflicts for a long time to come. 
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